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Introduction

The Spanish transition to democracy is justly deemed a success story due to the
relative fluidity of the process, the non-violent means in which Spain was able to
consolidate, and the stability of the democratic system over the last quarter of a decade.

Particularly noteworthy to Spain's success at democratic consolidation was the history
and events that preceded its foundation. The failures of Spain's previous attempt at a
democratic state, the brief and chaotic Second Republic (1931-36), gave rise to the

Spanish Civil War, a costly and bloody conflictthat polarizeda nation. The Civil War in
turn gave birth to one of the longest and most entrenched dictatorships of the last century,

the Franco regime (1939-1975).1 Few atthat time would have predicted the return of
democracy in Spain through non-violence, consensus, and moderation. Spain's historical

background is proof that democratic consolidation in the post-Franco era was nothing
short of miraculous. How then, did a country considered "anarchic in nature" undergo

the process of democratic consolidationsuccess fully? The answer lies within the ideas
of consensus and moderation that were ever present throughout the transition. Spain's

history of polarization, divergence, and suppressionwere vivid reminders of how the
success of the transition into democracy would be crucial to the welfare of the post-

Franco Spanish state. Thus, a capable and cognizant elite group of leaders upheld the
ideas of consensus of moderation throughout the transition process, in an effort to
modernize from the top. I argue that the ideas of consensus and moderation were the

lynchpins to the success of the democratization process in Spain after 1975. In the
following analysis, an investigation of the key events of the transition will show and how
the consensus and moderation were key to Spain's successful democratization.

Within the Spanish transition were a variety of key elements and events that
facilitated the move from Franco's rigid dictatorship to the parliamentary monarchy of

today. The role of leadership, particularly from King Juan Carlos, and the first freely
elected prime minister after Franco's death, Adolfo Suarez, is an important factor in
Spain's transition to democracy. The two leaders demonstrated negotiation skills,
resolve, and flexibility, while orchestrating the move to consolidation. Their

commitment to democratic values fueled the peaceful transition. Few could argue that
the transition would have been successful without the skillful supervision and negotiation
capabilities of King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez.

Likewise, the elections of 1977 marked a clear move in the consolidation process.

The elections were the first example of political pluralism and established a clear
separation from Francoism. The moderation and caution exhibited by the majority of

political parties involved exemplified the new ideology of"politics of consensus."2 All
major political parties demonstrated a resolve to form a consolidated parliamentary
democracy by making a shift towards the center and to associate themselves with a stance

of moderation and a unified commitment to democracy.
The Moncloa Pacts were the first true example of consensus and agreement to

dismantlethe Franco regime from the inside out. With the partnership of Franquist elites

and opposition leadersthe two groups enduredtedious efforts at negotiationand
compromise to create a series of economic and political reforms. The Moncloa Pacts
were a response to growing economic and political concerns that had remained

unaddressed under the leadership of former prime minister Arias Navarro.3 The Moncloa

Pacts gave assurances that the transition to democracy could be achieved through
peaceful negotiation and compromise.
The Constitution of 1978 institutionalized the ideas of democracy and tackled the

historically volatile issues ofregional nationalism and the separation ofchurch and state.4
The 1978 Constitution was a multi-political party endeavor, which proved challenging in

the face of a myriad of political ideologies and positions. Particularly crucial was the
compromises forged between the Union de Centro Democratico (UCD), centrist party

and the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE), socialist party. The use of
purposefully ambiguous language and the inclusion of controversial issues legitimized
the Constitution and further exemplified the idea of consensus among varied groups.

In consequence, the Spanish Constitution proved successful upon its completion and

approval onDecember 27,1978.5
The attempted military coup of 1981 stands out as perhaps the most threatening
event to the nascent democracy. Throughout the transition the Spanish military had
remained relatively intact and therefore retained much of its pre-transition power. It is
important to understand that the crux of Franco's government lay within a militaristic

right-wing regime. Thus, the progressive modifications of the new democracy directly
threatened hard-line Francoist military leaders. Acting under the supposed blessing of
King Juan Carlos, the commander in chief of the Spanish armed forces, Colonel Antonio

Tejero, and members of the Guardia Civil, held the Cortes (parliament) hostage for what
was to be an extremely tense few hours. Other military leaders, including Captain
General Jaime Milans del Bosch of Valencia, declared martial law and issued a manifesto

inthe name ofKing Juan Carlos.6 The attempted military coup proved unsuccessful due

to its leaders' inability to gain support from a substantial number of other military leaders
and to the lack of backing by the commander in chief, King Juan Carlos. Nevertheless,

the attempted military coup of 1981 proved decisive, for it soon led to a unified front
from both left and right parties against future conspirators. Likewise, it boosted public
support of democracy and made apparent the continued need for compromise and
consensus in the move towards democratic development.
An examination of the role of the 1982 elections will follow. The elections

marked the end of the transition as the socialist PSOE party won a majority and the

party's political leader, Felipe Gonzalez, took over as prime minister. The 1982 elections
are important because they marked the first democratic transition of power from the UCD
government headed by Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo to the Socialist PSOE party under

the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez. The PSOE symbolized the first genuine political party
in the majority, as opposed to the coalition party of the UCD. The elections of 1982

marked the end of the need for a centrist coalition party like the UCD and the end of the
transition itself. Spain was prepared to embark on a democratic trajectory aimed at
European integration and continued political and economic reform.
The above events and elements were crucial to the overall success of democratic

consolidation within Spain and must be evaluated in further detail. In order to understand

how the above factors facilitated the ideas of consensus and moderation a brief analysis
of the events leading up to 1975 is required to shed further light on how the issues of the
leadership of King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez, the 1977 elections, the Moncloa

Pacts, the 1978 Constitution, the 1981 attempted military coup, and the 1982 elections are
examples of consensus and negotiation within Spain's consolidation. As the historian

Edward Malefakis argues, "in Spain,the events after November20,1975, would be

completely incomprehensible if one did not understand whathad transpired during the
previous two decades ... Democracy in Spainwas made possible only because it was

preceded by a longperiodof whatmight loosely be calledprotodemocratization. This
o

period is therefore as deserving of examination as the one following Franco's death."
The year 1975,the year of the death of the authoritarian General Francisco

Franco, is arguably the year in which the Spanishtransition officially began. With the
death of General Franco in the early hours ofNovember 20,1975, few believed that the

Francoist regime would remain unchanged.9 Prior tothe Caudillo 's death, numerous
economic and cultural changes within the Franco regime had previously occurred, and
led most to believe a transition towards democracy would follow. Particularly crucial
was the economic boom of the 1960's, which was a direct result of the liberalization of

the Spanish economy. Between 1959 and 1973, the Spanish GDP had risen at an annual
rate of 7.3% due to the increase of foreign investments in a profitable tourist industry, the

remittancesof refugees working abroad, and an increase of foreign loans.

In the years

from 1960 to 1970, only Japan boasted faster and more sustained economic growth, a

development that propelled Spain's economy to the ranks of the world's top ten by the

mid-1970s.11 Prior to Spain's economic liberalization, General Franco maintained a
staunch policy of isolation, effectively limiting Spain's interaction with capitalist
societies. With the liberalization of the Spanish economy throughout the 1960s and
1970s a new culture emerged that was clearly a direct influence of an increasing

capitalistic Spanish society.12 Ineffect, a growing number of Spaniards were interested
in modernizing Spain and becoming a member of the strong European Economic

Community. By the time of General Franco's death in 1975, Spain was an advanced
capitalist industrial society that had outgrown an archaic regime. Few believed that the
Spanish system could remain the same after the passing of the regime leader. The issue
then became how would this impeding transition take place and who would bring it
about? After November 20,1975, a clear transformation was about to ensue, but which

course was Spain to follow?

General Franco had struggled with the issue of succession for a number of years

leading up to his death. In 1969 it was decided that the role of successor would fall to
Prince Juan Carlos de Bourbon, restoring the monarchy to Spain after forty-four years.

Two days after Franco's death, Juan Carlos was crowned King of Spain and the fate of
the Francoist regime remained unclear. Juan Carlos had been groomed under the Franco

regime throughout his childhood and was perceived to be able to lead Spain into a new
era, all the while staying loyal to the fundamental principles of Franco's Movimiento.

Others regarded Juan Carlos with distrust, particularly the Left opposition, believing him
to be Franco's puppet and too deeply entrenched within the military's hard-line right
wing. The young monarch had a long association with the military, including having
graduated from Spain's military academy. All the while others believed that he could be
the key to the democratic transition, because he was part of the Borbon legacy, a family
sentiment most clearly voiced by his father, Don Juan who advocated for change and

Spanish unity. In a Parisian declaration published on November 21,1975, Juan Carlos'
father Don Juan stated that "the duty of the monarchy now was to overcome the Civil
War, establish social justice, eliminate corruption, consolidate a real pluralist democracy

and seek full integration into the European Community."14 Juan Carlos was often caught

in crossfire between his former mentor, General Franco, and his father, Don Juan. At the

time of Franco's death little was known about Juan Carlos' own personal convictions,

mainly because Franco and his Francoist leaders were unwilling to allow Juan Carlos to
publicly divulge his political stance.

In January 1970, the Prince received a rare opportunity to be interviewed by New

York Times journalist, Richard Eder. In the interview, Juan Carlos discussed his plans for

Spain after he would succeed General Franco. According to Eder the Prince had "begun
to let his acquaintances know that he does not accept the role apparently chosen for him:
that of docile successor [and that] he has no intention of presiding over a dictatorship ...

He insists that only under some form of democracy will he have any real chance of
remaining King of Spain... 'I am Franco's heir', he told a visitor not long ago, 'but I am

Spain's heir, aswell."15 Inthe fall of 1975, the future course of Spain was to be
determined by the upcoming decisions of the new Head of State, King Juan Carlos, who
had made clear he meant to bring about change to Spain gradually and on his own terms.

The Effects of Leadership: The roles of King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez

It is impossible to discuss the success of the Spanish transition to democracy
without explaining the role of leadership within the process. The task of democratic
consolidation was a progression which involved a restructuring from the inside out. The

willingness of an elite group of leaders to dissolve the institution which guaranteed their

authority in order to create a new form of government is a testament to their commitment
and resolve to implement change and ensure successful democratic consolidation.
Equally remarkable was the negotiation and compromise exhibited by leaders of groups

from across the political spectrum and the orchestration of a few key players throughout
the process. Particularly influential were the roles of King Juan Carlos and the Prime
Minister Adolfo Suarez. It is difficult to determine if the results of the Spanish
democratization would have been the same had it not been for their efforts towards

compromise and consensus.

After the passing of the Caudillo in November of 1975, King Juan Carlos was left
with what could only be described as a state replete with uncertainty and unease. The

young monarch was faced with a complicated and uncertain future for Spain, a future in
which his decisions and policy making would influence the course of the distant future.
As Franco's handpicked chief of state, Juan Carlos was expected to uphold the
Fundamental Laws of Franco's Movement, the foundation of the Francoist regime. After

Franco's death, the King chose a path that did not include the plan for continuismo, or
"Francoism without Franco". Instead, Juan Carlos announced his intentions to set the

country on a democratic course. On November 22,1975 Juan Carlos was officially
proclaimed King by the Cortes, where the young monarch made a clear statement

expressing his wishes for a new Spain. He began his speech by respectfully
acknowledging Franco's dedication to Spain, but then made it indisputably clear that that

a new epoch was beginning.16 He called onthe nation to participate in a national
consensus, consequently establishing his role as "El Pilota del Cambio" (the pilot of
change).
The role of Juan Carlos in the transition is crucial to the better understanding of

its success. The King served as the ultimate mediator between the staunch right-wing
Francoists and a left that was anxious for change. On numerous occasions, Juan Carlos's

military background issued assurances to wary traditionalists, who demonstrated their
discomfort with the concessions they were required to make during the consolidation
process. Likewise, the young monarch was seen as a young, modern, capable leader by
the Spanish public. Throughout the democratic transition, King Juan Carlos toured
extensively in Spain to encourage public support and confidence. The King also gave
legitimacy to the process of consolidation by garnering support. Prior to the ratification
of the 1978 Constitution, Juan Carlos was the official Head of State, and therefore, was

considered the official authority regarding the legality of the transition. Overall,

throughout the democratization process, the role of Juan Carlos was one of mediator
through his sacrifice and willingness to compromise.
The Franco regime based its authority on an ever present military committed to
the Francoist ideals established in the Movimiento. Francoist military leaders were less

than willing to give up the authority specifically granted to them under Francoism, so the

responsibility of a mediator like Juan Carlos was crucial to the success of democratic
consolidation. There were many tense moments in which the right-wing traditionalists
threatened the fragile democracy. As Commander-In- Chief, Juan Carlos was the only
power that prevented them from overthrowing the nascent state. The King represented

the monarchy, an institution that trumped all threats posed by the military. It cannot be
underestimated that Juan Carlos provided a direct link between the old military regime
and the new consolidated Spain.

His military academy background and Francoist

associations provided the loyalty and assurances necessary to carry Spain into a new era.

As Richard Gunther argues, "a partisan president would have lacked the kind of
legitimacy possessed by Juan Carlos: no partisan president could have commanded the

obedience ofpotentially rebellious military officials."19 Similarly, Juan Carlos
commanded the respect of the left. The leader of the Communist Party, Santiago
Carrillo, stated that the King served as "the hinge between the apparatus of the State and

the authentic aspirations ofcivil society."20 Juan Carlos bridged the gap between the
conservative right and the progressive left.

Equally important was Juan Carlos' role as public figure and international

diplomat. Duringthe anxioustransitionthe King toured extensively to rally supportfor
the new phase in Spanish history. He traveled throughout Spain and in particularly
volatile areas like the Basque and Catalan regions, which provided distinct challenges to
consolidation. On February 16,1976, while on tour in Barcelona, the King made a

moving speech in Catalan assuring that regional nationalism would be respected and

honored within the new Spain.21 The gesture was remarkable given that under the Franco
regime regional nationalisms, like any other languages other than Castillian, were
severely oppressed. Against the advice of government officials, particularly those who
swayed towards Francoist traditions, Juan Carlos made numerous efforts at gaining the

support of all Spaniards including regionally distinct peoples like the Basques and
Catalans.

Likewise, Juan Carlos assumed the role of international diplomat by introducing

and selling the idea of Spanish democracy to the rest of the world. On June 2,1976 Juan
Carlos was received by President Ford and addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress

and Senate. In no uncertain terms, he declared Spain's commitment to democracy and

unyielding drive towards its consolidation. The monarch's visit to the U.S. proved
successful because his speech was later reported around the world where he was
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championed as Spain's engine ofchange.22 The international support afforded to the
King created the confidence andresolve to continue on the trek toward democratic
consolidation.

Perhaps the most crucial factor in the consolidation process was the legitimacy

provided by King Juan Carlos. Thetransition was remarkable in its ability to complete
its transform from the inside out. The success of the Falange regime to redefine itself as

a constitutional monarchy is greatly due to King Juan Carlos. As General Franco's

designated successor, Juan Carlos was legally able to lead Spain from the Francoist
regime to a democratic state, all within the confines of Franco's Movimiento and
Fundamental Laws. Throughout the consolidation process the King remained informed
of all decisions, and only with his support did the transition maintain its legality. It has
been statedthat the long term goal of Juan Carlos was to act as constitutional monarch

above politics, but the circumstances of the consolidation process required him to take a

political role.23 Within the first few years ofhis reign, Juan Carlos established himself as
a capableleaderwhose supportprovidedthe legitimacy and legalitynecessary to create
change.

Overall, the role of Juan Carlos was crucial to the success of the democratization

of Spain. Throughout the transition process the King demonstrated a fine example of a
leader committed to the ideals of democracy through consensus and compromise. Juan

Carlos bridged the two extremes of the political spectrum: the Falange Movement and
the popular Left. The young monarch beganhis reign by establishing himselfas a leader

that represented all interests of Spain, and demonstrated a resolve to represent all equally.
Likewise, Juan Carlos served as a successful diplomat before a scrutinizing international
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public. Equally important was the monarch's abilityto provide legitimacy to the
transition, while working within the system. The leadership of Juan Carlos was an

essential part of the success of the transition due to his dedication to working with a

variety of key elites on all sides and his readiness to compromise. Indeed, Spain owes a
great deal to the leadership and personal sacrifice of its monarch King Juan Carlos.
Within the first year of the monarch's reign, Prime Minister Arias had proved to
be ineffective. Carlos Arias Navarro was a remnant of the Francoist regime and lacked

the resolve and charisma to carry through with the new reform. Relations between Juan

Carlos and Arias were tolerant at best, but by mid-1976, the King saw the need for a

more progressive and compromising leader. The failure of the Arias government was due
in part to its unwillingness to negotiate with the left-wing opposition and the
government's doctrine to repress mass unrest. Reform efforts were not occurring at a

satisfactory pace and too much of the government's practices remained reminiscent of the
Franco regime. On July 1,1976 King Juan Carlos made the decision to call for Aria's

resignation and a new phase in the transition was to begin under the leadership of Adolfo
Suarez.24

Suarez was an unlikely candidate for the position of prime minister due to his
relative obscurity, but his background as a Francoist bureaucrat combined with his

youthful charm made him a promising leader. Juan Carlos made the unlikely choice of
Suarez because his lack of prominence within the Franco regime meant that he did not
have the baggage of the past, but at the same time, most felt he was not too radical a

break for the more traditional Falangists.25 Juan Carlos' decision proved successful,
given that Suarez was eventually able to convince the Francoist parliament to disband,
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peacefully relinquish its power, and was able to persuade the historic opposition of the
Franco regime, (the Partido Communista de Espafla, Communist Party), to abandon its
dream of restoring a republican government through revolution.

It was undoubtedly

through moderation, compromise and consensus that Suarez realized his greatest
achievements during the Spanish democratic transition.

The new youthful Suarez government set its sights on a series of reforms that
included a two part process: First,the government sought out the support of all three
main political forces, including the military, the democratic opposition, and reformoriented regime members. Second, they sought to create a reform law that would gain

legislative approval. In essence, the Suarez government wanted to construct a
referendum from above. Under the direction of Adolfo Suarez, the new government
succeeded in its attempts at reform. On December 6,1976, the referendum on the

Political Reform Law successfully ended Franquism via constitutional reform and

persuaded the democratic opposition to comply with new restructuring.27 How did
Adolfo Suarez achieve the challenging reform efforts that his predecessor Arias Navarro
failed to accomplish? The answer lies in Suarez's ability to negotiate and compromise
through consensus and the involvement of a variety of political players across the
political spectrum.

Suarez saw the need for reform within the Franquist institutions in order to
establish the new democratic government. The Political Reform Law sought to dismantle

some of the most important institutions ofthe Franco regime in order to help make the
break between the authoritarian and democratic regimes less traumatic for Falangist
leaders. It is easy to understand why Francoist elites would be hesitant to dismantle the
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institutionsthat held them in power. With promises of moderation and in particular, the
(

i

exclusion of the Communist Party (PCE) from participation in the transition, Suarez was

able to gain the support of the right during the reform efforts. The Left viewed Suarez

with promise, as he represented the "new generation" of change and negotiation.

Throughout the process, Suarez negotiated and compromisedwith all sides, which
garnered him the worthy nickname, "The Great Negotiator".

Throughout Suarez's efforts at reform, the Left changed its ideology based on a
break from Francoism to a negotiated democratic break. Suarez assured the opposition
that they would be included in the transition and that their input would be valued. Suarez
stayed true to his promises to the Left when he eventually legalized the Communist Party

(PCE), much to the outrage of the right-wing military. The prime minister saw the need
to include all facets of the political sphere, even at the risk of isolating some of the
staunch Francoist elite. Suarez's calculated bargaining and effort toward compromise
provided the necessary balance to legitimize his reform efforts and include all groups.

The success of Suarez's Political Reform Law was due in large part to the
concessions it provided for both sides. The Left was satisfied with the inclusion of the

notion of popular sovereignty, which appeased Catalan and Basque regions with the fact
that the Political Reform Law, made no mention of Franco's Movimiento or National

Council. The Right was eventually convinced because the Reform Law made no

provision for government responsibility to the legislature, and because the Council of

Realm, while it was to be more democratized, remained intact. Equally important, was
that King Juan Carlos backed Suarez's reforms, providing assurances that satisfied the

Right wing.29 Although the Political Reform Law was to go through more alterations, the
i
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general concept of consensus and moderation remained prevalent and eventually
accounted for its success.

Adolfo Suarez proved himself as a capable leader who was willing to negotiate

and create a new type of politics, based on consensus. His finely crafted Political Reform
Laws proved that with moderation and compromise, the incorporation of all political
sides in the national enterprise was possible. The prime minister served as an example

throughout the consolidation process and set the tone for the 1977 elections, the first

democratic elections since 1931.30 With the public support ofthe transition with them,
Prime Minister Suarez and King Juan Carlos had formed a productive centrist

government capable of leading Spain into a new chapter. The culmination of their efforts
and the ideas of moderation, consensus, and compromise were the predominant themes of
the impending 1977 elections.
The Influence and Significance of the 1977 Elections

Riding high after the success of the Political Reform Law, Suarez viewed the

1977 elections as an opportunity to legitimize his government by a democratic popular
vote. The prime minister established a new political party, the UCD (Union del Centro

Democratico) as a centrist coalition party whose ideology was based on the ideas of

consensus and cautious reform. With the exception of radical parties, all political parties
exhibited moderation and caution in the elections. The most repeated slogan was one of
commitment to a centrist non-violent stance and to democratic consolidation.

The

political parties all employed ambiguous messages that attempted to avoid confrontation.
The establishment of a parliamentary democracy took precedence over partisan

concerns.32
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By the end of the 1977 elections, Suarez's UCD party and the Socialist PSOE,
headed by Felipe Gonzalez, were the most successful at representing themselves as part
of the core symbols ofthe transition. The UCD and PSOE accounted for 63 % of the
votes cast and 80 % of the seats in the Congress of Deputies or Cortes. The Communist
Party (PCE) and Alianza Popular (AP) also gained a considerable number of seats in the
new Parliament, proving that the new government was a pluralistic democracy.
Overall, the elections were free from corruption and resulted in the UCD's victory

in Parliament, granting the Suarez government democratic legitimacy. The elections also
exhibited impressive results by the Socialist parties, which meant that they would be

included in the drafting of the Constitution. Poor results from extremist groups verified
that the public supported moderation and the idea of consensus, versus the more extremist

measures.34 Reminders ofthe 1936 democratic elections, which preceded the Spanish
Civil War, provided the incentive for varied political powers to endeavor towards
compromise and bring about a new system based on a common objective. The outcome
of the 1977 elections confirmed that regime elites and the Left would have to share one

unified goal: the consolidation of a parliamentary democracy.
The Moncloa Pacts

Between 1973 and 1977, the Spanish government had focused exclusively on the

political transition and had not addressed the growing economic problems of
unemployment and inflation. Although inflation never fell below 15 %, unemployment

had risen more than two and a halftimes between 1973 and 1977.35 Due to growing
unrest and labor strikes, Prime Minister Suarez finally began to address these concerns in

early October 1977. The Moncloa Pact meetings included nine major party leaders who
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met to discuss the country's growing economic issues. The ending result included an
economic and political pact, although the economic part of the Moncloa Pact was
considered most crucial.

The economic concerns addressed in the forty-page text of the Moncloa Pacts

included increasedpensions by 30 % and increased unemploymentbenefits to the same
level as the minimum wage. Also, a progressive tax reform was established to include

new corporate taxes and a permanent tax onwealth.37 Inexchange for the economic
reforms workers were asked to accept a ceiling of 22 % on wage increases until 1978.
Labor unions were satisfied with the economic reforms and in exchange agreed to end the
crippling labor strikes.

Likewise, the Moncloa Pacts included a number of political reforms aimed at

revising the educational system, addressing housing shortages, social security concerns,
agrarian reform, and perhaps most crucially, reforms to the Law of Public Order. The
Moncloa Pacts created some 700,000 new classrooms for students in public schools and

promised to introduce new curriculum that included regional language and culture.
Under the Franco regime, regional languages such as, Basque or Catalan were strictly
prohibited from being included in public education curriculums. Programs aimed at

addressing the housing shortages included the construction of subsidized housing and
control of urban land speculation. Social security reforms included increased control and
scrutiny of Parliament over existing and future programs. Agrarian reform efforts were
established to convert renters into landowners and put an end to sharecropping.

All of

the above aims at reform included a more progressive and inclusive approach at
economic and political policies.
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The political agreements of the Moncloa Pacts were short-term legislative
measures that were meant to address current matters until the Constitution was drafted.

Perhaps most important was the revision of the Law of Public Order. The reforms

redefined the concept of public order and included new legislation concerning the Civil
Guard. The police force had been formerly under the control of the military, but now was
placed under the Ministry of Interior, beginning the transfer of power from the military to
civilian control.40

The Monocloa Pacts were central to the Spanish transition due to their success at
addressing economic concerns posed by labor unions and the economy crisis of the
1970s. Similarly, the political reforms tackled grave issues that remained unchanged

from the Franco regime. Perhaps most importantly, the Moncloa Pacts reaffirmed the
transition's commitment to compromise and the ability of the elite leadership to negotiate
with groups from across the political sphere. To practice in other words, what is known
as the politics of consensus. A new, pluralistic, government was redefining Spanish
policymaking and creating reforms that were drastically different from those found under

the Franco regime. This new strategy would produce continued success during the
drafting of the 1978 Constitution.
Drafting the 1978 Constitution

Laura Desfor Edles describes a constitution as "an attempt by political elites to
forge political order, by expressing the shared value of democracy, i.e. the right of the
people to govern, rather than the partisan interests of the elites of the political

community."41 The 1978 Spanish Constitution exemplified how a group ofpolitical
elites negotiated tirelessly to create a constitution that tackled some of the most
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controversial and volatile issues in Spanish politics and formally institutionalized the
nascent democracy. The success of the drafting of the 1978 Constitution was viewed as a

triumph because of the ability of a group of political elites to further utilize a 'politics of

consensus' strategy, while including multi-partisan ideologies. The 1978 Constitution
was intrinsic in the trajectory of the Spanish consolidation process, because it

institutionalized the idea of democracy through non-violent means and established the

foundations to new Spanish policymaking and the new Spanish state.
The drafting of the Constitution began on August 1,1977 when a sub-committee

of the Cortes was formed by seven leaders of the main political parties of the Parliament.
There were three leaders were from the UCD party, one from the PSOE socialist party,
one from the Communist party, one Catalan centrist, and one representative of the AP
party, all representing various facets of the political spectrum within Parliament. All

agreed to an oath of secrecy and to an alphabetical rotation of the position of

subcommittee chair throughout the drafting process.42 The writing ofthe Constitution
would prove to be an arduous, complicated task, marked by a series of mini crises and
tense moments. If it had not been for the leaders' commitment to democracy and their

ability to negotiate effectively, the drafting of the Constitution would not have yielded the
same results.

The two most debated issues concerning the Constitution dealt with the questions
of clericalism and nationalism. Under the Franco regime, Catholicism was declared the
official religion, creating iron-clad ties between state institutions and the Church. The

drafters of the Constitution struggled to agree on controversial subjects concerning public
education and the influenceof the Church, abortionand divorce, and freedom of religion.
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Likewise, the debate over regional nationalism loomed heavy. The Franco regime had
fought tirelessly to suppress all forms of national identity and to outlaw many forms of its
expression. The two major cleavages of clericalism and regional nationalism created
distinct challenges for the leaders and demanded that they employ compromise,

negotiation, and moderation throughout the drafting of the Constitution.
Although the drafting process was not free from heated arguments and walk-outs,

most notably by the PSOE party on March 7,1978, the political elites worked diligently

tocreate one ofthe most advanced Constitutions inEurope.43 How then did they agree
on these historically explosive concerns? The 1978 Constitution deals with the major
cleavages in Spanish society by using vague and ambiguous language to satisfy both

sides. The carefully-constructed document was a product of sacrifice on all political
sides and is a testament to the commitment of the elite leadership to tackle the main
concerns of clericalism and regional nationalism by means of the Constitution.
In regard to the issue of the Church and state, the drafters agreed that state

funding would be insured for religious institutions, but that the state has the authority to
inspect all educational institutions. The AP and UCD political parties advocated for the
continuation of funding to religious educational institutions, while the Socialist PSOE

wanted more state involvement and guidelines.44 Inreference to the issue of abortion and
divorce, the constitutional text allowed for the eventual legalization of divorce, but used

minimal and vague terminology that neither legalized nor prohibited divorce and

abortion.45 The issue ofthe de-establishment ofthe Catholic Church was the most highly
polarizing issue concerning clericalism. The PSOE socialist party and the PCE
communist party argued that all official state associations with the Catholic Church be
:
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dissolved, but to right-wing parties the idea of a secular state was incomprehensible. The
two sides compromised and included the acknowledgement of the Catholic Church

within the state, but also allowed for religious tolerance and pluralism.46 The negotiation
and compromise exhibited on all sides cannot be overstated given the complexity and
historical background of clericalism in the Spanish state. The Constitution's success at

addressing this controversial and divisive issue is due the drafters' implementation of the
politics of consensus and to their dedication to establishing real democracy.
Equally polarizing in the drafting process was the question of national
regionalism. The AP party proposed a unitarian state that was relatively unchanged from

the Franco regime, while nationalist parties from the Basque and Catalan regions sought
the right to self-determination. The eventual result was the granting of autonomy to each

region, while preserving the indivisibility of Spain.47 Representatives from Catalonia
endorsed the final result, but the Basques rejected it, which led to further conflict in the

following years.48
On October 31,1978 both houses of the Cortes formally approved the

Constitution, and in December of 1978 the Spanish public ratified it, legitimizing the new

democracy.49 Nicknamed the "Constitution ofConsensus", the final product was nothing
short of exemplary. The elites' ability to negotiate and compromise successfully allowed
for formal institutionalizationof the Spanish democracy. Particularly crucial was the
UCD party and PSOE party's willingness to negotiate. Both parties allowed for the
ability to break paralyzing stalemates on more than one occasion, which resulted in the

quick movement ofthe Constitution outof committee and through the Cortes.50 Once
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again, the politics of consensus were put into practice yielding practical results: the 1978
Spanish Constitution.
23-F: The Unforeseen Results

The attempted military coup d' etat of 1981, was a crucial moment in the

transition to democracy. On February 23,1981 a group of Francoist military leaders
attempted to overthrow the new democracy in the name of King Juan Carlos, who they
claimed supported the coup d' etat. The attempted coup was thwarted due to the
leadership of King Juan Carlos and the united leadership of government officials. The

events of February 1981 were one of the most serious threats to the Spanish state, but
ultimately they reaffirmed the necessity of compromise and consensus and united
Spaniards in a continued endeavor towards the consolidation of democracy. It is

therefore important to examine the motivations behind the attempted coup, and how the
failure of a few disenchanted military leaders accounted for part of the success of Spanish
democracy.

By the year 1981 some military "hard-liners" had felt that they had been

repeatedly deceived and betrayed by the transition. The Suarez government had given
three important assurances to gain the support of the military during the consolidation
process. These assurances included that the Communist party would never be legalized,
that regional autonomy would not be granted, and that transitional reforms would not

include a complete dismantling of Francoism. In all three instances the Suarez
government was unable to remain true to its word, creating growing hostilities between

transition leaders and the Francoist military. From 1975 to 1981, a number of military
leaders resigned in frustration and outrage to the new changes and were replaced with
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more liberal leaders.51 The replacements only increased the animosity between the
Francoist military and reformists. The cleavage between transition leaders and rightwinged military leaders created a divisive environment conducive to takeover attempts.

It is known that between 1975 and 1982 there were at least five planned coup d' etats

uncovered by the government.52 Threats tothe emerging democracy were real and ever
present.

Contributing to the hostile situation was growing activity by Basque terrorist
groups, which fueled right-wing military leaders' insistence on change. Ironically, both
groups were disenchanted with the transition and advocated for immediate results.

Military leaders felt that the new government failed to resolve the Basque terrorism using
appropriate force, and Basque independence groups wanted increased autonomy and

recognition. Each prompted the other side into becoming increasingly more volatile and
reactionary.

The disillusion and frustration came to a breaking point on February 23,

1981.

On February 23,1981 the Cortes was in session taking part in a ballot roll call to
decide on whether to accept the new Calvo Sotelo administration. While in session,
Colonel Antonio Tejero and the Guardia Civil burst into the Cortes and held the Cortes

hostage. Meanwhile, Captain General Jaime Milans del Bosch of Valencia declared

martial law in the city of Valencia and issueda manifesto in the name of King Juan
Carlos. Milans del Boschtelephoned other generals around the country in support of the
coupand claimed that he and his fellow conspirators had the support of the King. At the

same time, King Juan Carlos attempted to contact the same generals to demand that they
rejectall actions of the coup d' etat. By February 24 Juan Carloshad gained the
1

/•'
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confidence of the majority ofthe military leaders and Milans del Bosch withdrew his

troops from the streets of Valencia. Colonel Tejero began to negotiate his surrender and
six hours later and Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo was elected prime minister by a vast majority
in the Cortes.54

The failure of 23-F was due in part to the inability of Milans del Bosch and Tejero
to convince a substantial number of their colleagues to participate, and to their

misreading of King Juan Carlos' support.55 Likewise, 23-F failed because Juan Carlos
was unwilling to meet the demands of the conspirators and remained committed to the

ideals of democracy. Perhaps the most important aspect of the attempted coup d' etat
were the unforeseen results. The nervous hours of 23-F sparked an increasingly united

feeling among leaders from across the political spectrum against the conspirators.
Members of all major political parties were held hostage in the Cortes by Colonel Tejero,
creating a united front against the threat to democracy. Also important was the public
support of the government bolstered by 23-F. After the attempted coup, some three

million Spaniardsof various political beliefs, demonstratedtheir support of democracy in

the streetsof Spain. Presentat the massivedemonstration in Madrid were political party
leaders Manuel Fraga, Felipe Gonzalez, and Santiago Carrillo, as well as leaders of the

UCD and national labor organizations.56 The presence ofleaders and demonstrators of
diverse politicalpositions illustrates how the effects of the attemptedcoup d' etat lent
powerful support to the consolidation of democracy and the belief in moderation and

negotiation. Overall, the happenings on February23,1981 reaffirmed that temperance
and consensuswere necessary if the fragile new democracy were to persevere past its
infancy.
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The 1982 Elections- End of the Transition

The final step of the democratic consolidation process was the 1982 elections,

which marked the first peaceful transfer ofpolitical power from the Right tothe Left.57
The PSOE victory was a historic win because it signified the dominance of a genuine
political party, versus the transitional coalition of the UCD. In October of 1982, the
Spanish transitional era had come to an end, as a new political party took over and

brought continued success to Spain through Europeanization and improved living
standards.

How was the PSOE Socialist Party able to gain the support necessary to unseat
the longstanding champion of the transition, the UCD? The answer lies in what the UCD

symbolized during and after the transition. The UCD was a coalition political party

formed for the specific purpose of serving as the cooperative and moderate political party
that could facilitate the transition. The UCD represented the road to consolidation, a

function that was complete by the 1982 elections. In contrast, the PSOE represented the
post-transition Spain a Spain ready to gain European recognition and assume a role in the

European economy. PSOE leader Felipe Gonzalez promised a modernized Spain that

would include Europeanization and improved living standards.58 Gonzalez delivered.
Under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez and the PSOE government, Spain was

admitted into the European Community in 1986. Immediately, the gap between other

European countries' living standards and Spain's was narrowed.59 Spain's increased
spending on educationcaused for adult literacyto rise by 100 %, and the arrival of Spain

as a modernized, legitimate nationwas celebrated on a global scale in 1992 when Spain
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hosted the World's Fair and Summer Olympics.60 Spain had proven itself as an
international force and serious contributor on a world-wide scale.

The 1982 elections marked the end of the transition because it signified the end of
the consolidation process and the long-term stabilization of the new regime. Spain had
achieved this by committing to democratic ideals and to moderation and a policy of
consensus. The 1982 elections were the culminating chapter in an arduous, yet
successful transition to democracy.
Conclusions

Often Spain is considered the modern 'model of democratization' due to the

relative fluidity and pace at which the nation was able to consolidate. Spain was able to
achieve democratization through non-violent means, despite having a history of conflict
and divisiveness. Few would have predicted the multiple accomplishments of Spain in
the post-Franco era. The Spanish success story is the result of numerous factors,

particularly the implementation of the ideas of consensus and moderation throughout key
events in the transition. The notion of consensus and moderation were the core to the

Spanish democratization process and account for the overall success of the transition.

The democratization of Spain was a process of modification from the top using
negotiation and compromise as the mainstays to stability and longevity of the new

system. It is to the ideas of consensus and moderation that Spain owes its success.
The Franco regime perhaps unwittingly provided the foundation, for the transition

to democracy through economic preparation and subsequential entrance into the world

market. Upon Franco's passing, King Juan Carlos took the helm to provide the necessary
leadership to proceed towards legitimate democracy. With his appointment of Adolfo
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Suarez, the tide further turned towards a more progressive and pluralistic course. The
1977 elections created legitimacy for the Suarez government and provided the first

examples of political pluralism. Under the Suarez government Spain underwent
numerous reforms that included the Moncloa Pacts and the drafting of the 1978
Constitution that institutionalized the Spanish democratic state. The attempted military

coup of 1981 created a cautionary reminder to Spain's leaders and general public of how
fragile the democratic system was and how they had to unite against undemocratic

opposition. The 1982 elections marked the end of the transition and secured the Spanish
system as a long-term functioning government.
Throughout all of the above events the commitment to the democratic ideals and

the notions ofconsensus and moderation were essential. Spain sought a course of

democratization using compromise and negotiation as its compass and achieved greatness

on an international scale. As Spain enjoys continued prosperity and success on an
international scale it can be assumed that the lessons of consensus and moderation of the

transition era are relevant to its future course and progress.
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